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Following the success of the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) in sta-
bilizing the United States hospital-intern market, the United Kingdom also adopted
centralized matching procedures in the markets for medical internships in the 1960s.1
However, there are two important diﬀerences between the UK programs and their
North American counterparts (Roth 1991). First, the UK medical intern markets are
organized regionally rather than nationally: in diﬀerent regions, diﬀerent algorithms
were adopted by central matching programs. Many of those were abandoned after sev-
eral years and replaced by new algorithms. An intriguing observation here is that the
abandoned algorithms all produced pairwise-unstable matchings and their successor
algorithms all produced pairwise-stable matchings. One region adopted a pairwise-
stable matching algorithm from the start, and it has been used successfully since.
Roth (1991) suggested that this natural experiment in the UK markets proved the
robustness of pairwise-stable matchings.
Second, in the UK markets, each medical student is required to complete two in-
ternships, one medical and one surgical, in a period of twelve months, to be eligible for
full registration as doctors (no such categories exist in the US). Each internship lasts
for six months. Consultants in teaching hospitals seek some number of students to ﬁll
internships in either medicine or surgery.2 Thus, given the requirement of UK interns to
experience both medical and surgical positions, each regional market in the UK needs to
be modeled as a “special” two-sided many-to-two matching problem, unlike in the US
m a r k e t .E v e ni nt h i sp r o b l e m ,t h eG a l e - S h a pley deferred-acceptance algorithms (Gale
and Shapley 1962) yield pairwise-stable matchings under a preference restriction (Roth
1984b, 1985b; Blair 1988). However, this outcome may no longer be group-stable in a
many-to-two matching problem (Blair 1988; Roth 1991). This shows a clear contrast
with a many-to-one matching market like the US hospital intern market. Although a
pairwise-stable matching is required to be immune to only one- or two-agent devia-
tions, Roth (1984a) showed that if a larger size coalition can deviate from a matching,
then a coalition of size one or two can also deviate in many-to-one matching problem.
Thus, a pairwise-stable matching is also immune to group deviations. Hence, market
stabilization by introduction of centralized matching programs is well justiﬁed. How-
1It is well known that an introduction of the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) was
a dramatic success in stabilizing the US hospital-intern market (see Roth 1984a; Roth and Sotomayor
1990; and Roth and Peranson 1998). Roth (1984a) demonstrated that the NRMP matching mechanism
is equivalent to the Gale-Shapley ﬁrm-optimal stable mechanism in the many-to-one matching problem,
which produces a pairwise-stable matching under responsive preferences.
2In the UK market, consultants rather than hospitals are the agents who hire medical students.
2ever, in many-to-two (-many) matching problems, there can be a group deviation from
a pairwise-stable matching that improves the payoﬀ of every member of the deviation.
Thus pairwise-stable matchings are not even Pareto-eﬃcient. This creates a puzzle:
Why is the pairwise-stable matching so robust in the UK markets?
In this paper, we provide theoretical support for the robustness of pairwise stabil-
ity allowing for deviations by groups in many-to-many matching problems. We ﬁrst
introduce an appropriate deﬁnition of a group deviation in many-to-many matching
problems. However, there is often no group-stable matching, i.e., a matching that is
immune to any group deviations in many-to-many matching problems. This may seem
problematic, but it is not bad news, since a closer look at possible group deviations
from a pairwise-stable matching reveals that these deviations are not credible in a cer-
tain way. Even if a group of agents would beneﬁt from deviating by reorganizing their
partnerships, some members may not have incentive to follow the suggested reorgani-
zation completely. Consider the following situation. A group is somehow organized,
and the members of the group communicate with each other about a deviation plan,
and they agree on carrying it out the next day without letting outsiders know about
the plan. In the plan, it has been suggested to each of the group’s members that she
should discontinue some existing partnerships while keeping others and forming some
new partnerships with other members. Do all the members follow the suggestion?
Some members may choose to follow the plan only partially. For example, it may be
even more proﬁtable for some of them not to form some of the suggested partnerships,
but instead to keep some existing partnerships they were told to discontinue. In such a
case, the suggested group deviation cannot be carried out successfully (unless a group
can form a binding agreement). In this case, we say that these deviations are not
“executable.” More precisely: an executable group deviation is a deviation with a pro-
posed matching that speciﬁes each member’s partners and is pairwise-stable within the
members of the coalition, assuming outsiders of the coalition are passive agents.3 We
say that a matching is credibly group-stable if it is immune to any executable group
deviation.
The ﬁrst main result of this paper is that the set of credibly group-stable matchings
is equivalent to the set of pairwise-stable matchings when one side has responsive
preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences (Theorem 1).
This domain is natural in the sense that it is the simplest preference domain in the
3Pairwise stability within the deviation group with passive outsiders prevents the following two
cases of possible further deviations: a member of the coalition may not want to form some of the links
she is supposed to form according to the plan, and she may keep some of the links with outsiders she
was told to discontinue; or a pair of members of the group, who are supposed to discontinue links with
each other according to the plan, may not go along with the recommendation.
3UK hospital-intern markets based on agents’ preferences over individuals. As in the
US hospital-intern market, agents submit their preferences over individual partners
(interns submit preference rankings over individual consultants in each category), not
over subsets of partners.
Credible group stability requires only that no group deviation from a matching is
executable. However, there is no guarantee that an executable group deviation itself
will be immune to further executable deviations. Thus, to be consistent, game theorists
may say that credibility of group deviation should be deﬁned recursively: a deviation
is said to be credible if it is immune to further credible deviations. In strategic-form
games, a strategy proﬁle is said to be a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim,
Peleg, and Whinston 1987) if it is immune to any credible deviation in this sense.4 Our
second result shows that the set of matchings generated as outcomes of the coalition-
proof Nash equilibria of a strategic-form game appropriately generated from a many-
to-many matching problem coincides with the set of credibly group-stable matchings of
the same matching problem in the same preference domain as in Theorem 1 (Theorem
2). Theorems 1 and 2 provide justiﬁcations for Roth’s (1991) observation of the UK
medical intern markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and deﬁne traditional solution concepts in the literature as well as our new solution
concept, credible group stability. We provide examples that illustrate the diﬀerences
between these concepts. In Section 3, we start with a weak preference restriction,
substitutability (Kelso and Crawford 1982). We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tac r e d i b l yg r o u p -
stable matching is pairwise-stable (Proposition 1), while a pairwise-stable matching
may not be credibly group-stable as long as one side has substitutable preferences
even if the other side has responsive preferences (Proposition 2). In Section 3, we
prove the equivalence between pairwise stability and credible group stability if one
side has responsive preferences and the other has categorywise-responsive preferences
(Theorem 1). However, when both sides have categorywise-responsive preferences, the
equivalence result may fail (Example 5), and even credibly group-stable matching may
not exist (Example 6). In Section 4, we consider a natural strategic-form game of
4A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to any credible strategic
coalitional changes in the members’ strategies, and the credibility of strategic coalitional deviations is
deﬁned recursively in a consistent manner (see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1987). Our equivalence
result gives us another reason that our non-characte r i s t i cf u n c t i o na p p r o a c hi sm o r ep r e f e r a b l et h a n
the characteristic function approach in matching problems. The counterpart of a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in a characteristic function form game is the credible core in Ray (1989) that checks
credibility of coalitional deviations recursively. However, as is shown in Ray (1989), the core and
t h ec r e d i b l ec o r ea r ee q u i v a l e n ti nc h a r a c t e r i s t i cfunction form games. Ray’s remarkable result also
motivates our usage of non-characteristic function form games.
4many-to-many matching problems and show that the set of the matchings generated
through the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of this game, the set of pairwise-stable
matchings, and the set of credibly group-stable matchings are all equivalent under the
same preference domain as in Section 3 (Theorem 2). Section 5 concludes the paper
with an application of our results in one-sided matching markets.
1.1 Related Literature
The most closely related paper is an independent work by Echenique and Oviedo (2003)
on many-to-many matching problems. They use setwise stability as deﬁned by Roth
(1984b) as their solution concept. A setwise-stable matching is a matching that is
immune to any group deviations in which participating members have no incentive to
discontinue any partnership after the deviation. One of the main results in Echenique
and Oviedo (2003) is that if one side has substitutable preferences and the other has
“strongly substitutable” preferences, then pairwise stability and setwise stability are
equivalent. Our main result states that if one side has categorywise-responsive prefer-
ences and the other side has responsive preferences, then pairwise-stability and credible
group-stability are equivalent. Although these two result may appear similar, they have
no logical relationship with each other, since neither solution concepts nor preference
domains in these two statements are the same. Setwise stability is a stronger solution
concept than our credible group stability, since the executability requirement rules out
more group deviations than individual stability. In the general preference domain, we
have group-stable set ⊆ setwise-stable set ⊆ credibly group-stable set ⊆ pairwise-stable
set. Although categorywise-responsive preferences belong to a family of substitutable
preferences, strongly substitutable preferences have no logical relationship with respon-
sive preferences (with quotas).5
In many-to-one matching problems, Kelso and Crawford (1982) showed that the
Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm still ﬁnds (pairwise-)stable matchings un-
der substitutable preferences. Subsequently, Roth (1984b, 1985b, 1991) and Blair
(1988) studied the structure of the set of pairwise-stable matchings in a many-to-many
setting under substitutable preferences. On the lattice structure of pairwise-stable
matchings, Blair (1988), Alkan (1999), andE c h e n i q u ea n dO v i e d o( 2 0 0 3 )p r o v i d e dr e -
sults in many-to-many matching problems using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of supremum (and
inﬁmum) under diﬀerent preference domains.
In many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences, a randomized my-
5Indeed, as Sotomayor (1999) pointed out in her example (see Example 3 below), the set of setwise-
stable matchings may be empty under separable preferences (which is a weaker requirement than
responsive preferences).
5opic adjustment process also yields a pairwise-stable matching with probability one
(see Roth and Vande Vate 1990).6 In our separate note (Konishi and Ünver 2004), we
show that a similar convergence result still holds in many-to-many matching problems
if agents have categorywise-responsive preferences. This result justiﬁes our characteri-
zation of the whole set of pairwise-stable matchings instead of the optimal matchings
generated by the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithms.7
2 The Model
2.1 Many-to-Many Matching Problem
Let F and W be ﬁnite sets of ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sw i t hF ∩ W = ∅. For any agent
i ∈ F ∪ W,t h eset of potential partners Mi is the set of agents on the other side:
i.e., Mi = W if i ∈ F,a n dMi = F if i ∈ W.W e d e ﬁne a preference proﬁle by
º=( ºF,ºW)=( ( ºi)i∈F∪W),w h e r eºi is a preference ordering over 2Mi.W ea l s ou s e
notations º=( ºF,ºW),w h e r eºF and ºW denote preference proﬁles for F and W,
respectively. We assume throughout the paper that for any agent i ∈ F ∪ W,a g e n t
i’s preference relation ºi is strict: i.e. ºi is a linear order, meaning that for any
S,T ⊆ Mi, S ºi T implies that S = T or S Âi T.A many-to-many matching
problem is a list (F,W,º).W e ﬁx a many-to-many matching problem (F,W,º) in
the rest of the paper. A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of
all subsets of F ∪ W such that for all i,j ∈ F ∪ W:( i )µ(i) ∈ 2Mi,a n d( i i )j ∈ µ(i) if
and only if i ∈ µ(j).
2.2 Preference Restrictions
The most commonly used preference restriction in matching theory is that of respon-
siveness with quota. Agent i’s preference relation ºi is responsive with quota if there
is a positive integer qi such that for any T ⊂ Mi with |T| <q i,a n da n yj,j0 ∈ Mi\T,
6In the more general one-sided matching problems, Chung (2000) generalizes the Roth-Vande Vate
argument by introducing a “no odd rings condition,” and Diamantoudi, Miyagawa, and Xue (2002)
show a convergence whenever a pairwise stable matching exists by conﬁning their attention to the
strict preference domain. Klaus and Klijn (2004) provide a positive result (under weak responsiveness)
in many-to-one markets with couples.
7Upon a recommendation by Roth and Peranson (1999), the US hospital-intern matching program
now uses a mechanism based on the Roth-Vande Vate approach instead of the Gale-Shapley deferred-
acceptance algorithm.
6we have8
(i) T ∪ {j}Â i T ∪ {j
0} ⇔ j Âi j
0 and
(ii) T ∪ {j}Â i T ⇔ j Âi ∅,
and for any T ⊆ Mi with |T| >q i,w eh a v e∅ Âi T (Roth 1985a).9 A preference proﬁle
ºT is responsive if for any i ∈ T, ºi is responsive with some quota qi.
Substitutability is a weaker preference restriction than responsiveness, yet some of
the important results obtained with responsive preferences are preserved under substi-
tutability: it still guarantees the existence of pairwise-stable matchings and the validity
of the polarization results in many-to-many matching problems (Roth 1984b). For any
i ∈ F ∪ W,a n da n yS ⊂ Mi,l e tChi(S) ⊆ S be such that Chi(S) ºi T for any
T ⊆ S.A g e n ti’s preference relation ºi is substitutable if for any S ⊆ Mi and any
distinct j,j0 ∈ Chi(S),w eh a v ej ∈ Chi(S\{j0}) (Kelso and Crawford 1982). For any
T ⊆ F ∪W, a preference proﬁle ºT is substitutable if for any i ∈ T, ºi is substitutable.
We now introduce a new preference restriction that is stronger than substitutability
but weaker than responsiveness with quota. This preference restriction retains the
virtues of responsive preferences yet makes it possible to analyze a market like the UK
hospital-intern market. We ﬁrst introduce the notion of categories of partners. For
each agent i ∈ F ∪W, let Ki be a ﬁnite set called the set of categories for i,a n dl e t
{Mk
i }k∈Ki be a partition of Mi.A g e n ti’s preference relation ºi is separable across





if for any category k ∈ Ki,a n yS,T ⊆ Mk
i ,
and any I,J ⊆ Mi\Mk
i ,w eh a v e
S ∪ I ºi T ∪ I ⇔ S ∪ J ºi T ∪ J.
Agent i’s preference relation ºi is categorywise-responsive with quotas if there are
a set of categories Ki, a partition {Mk
i }k∈Ki of Mi, and a vector of quotas qi =( qk
i )k∈Ki






in each category k ∈ Ki, the restriction of ºi to 2Mk
i is responsive with quota qk
i .10 A
8Without confusion, we abuse notations: j ºi j0, ∅ ºi j and j ºi ∅ denote {j}º i {j0}, {j}º i ∅
and ∅ ºi {j}, respectively, for any j,j0 ∈ Mi.
9Note that under a strict preference ordering, Condition (ii) implies T Âi T ∪{j} ⇔∅Âi j as well.
Also note that Condition (ii) is commonly referred to as “separability” in the literature.
10A regional UK medical intern market can be modeled as a many-to-many matching problem
where one side has responsive preferences (consultants), whereas the other has categorywise-responsive
preferences with quotas (interns). Let F and W denote consultants and interns, respectively. Each
consultant j ∈ F specializes either in medicine or surgery, i.e., F is partitioned into Fm and Fs.N o
consultant j categorizes interns, and thus she can have responsive preferences with quota qj that is
the number of positions j has. On the other hand, each intern i ∈ I has category set Ki = {m,s}
7preference proﬁle ºT is categorywise-responsive if for any i ∈ T, ºi is categorywise-
responsive with some quota vector qi =( qk
i )k∈Ki.11
In independent work, Echenique and Oviedo (2003) introduced another preference
restriction. Agent i’s preference ºi is strongly substitutable if for any S,T ⊆
Mi with S Âi T, j ∈ Chi(S ∪ {j}) implies j ∈ Chi(T ∪ {j}). There is no logical
relationship between responsiveness and strong substitutability (Echenique and Oviedo
2003).12 A preference proﬁle ºT is strongly substitutable if for any i ∈ T, ºi is strongly
substitutable.
2.3 Solution Concepts
In this subsection, we discuss solution concepts used in this paper. First, for any agent
i ∈ F ∪ W, we say that set S ⊆ Mi is individually rational for i if S ºi ∅,a n di s
individually stable for i if Chi (S)=S. Obviously, individual stability implies indi-
vidual rationality, but not vice versa. We also say that a matching µ is individually
rational (individually stable)i fµ(i) is individually rational (individually stable) for
any i ∈ F ∪W. We say that for any agent i ∈ F ∪W, j ∈ Mi is acceptable if j ºi ∅.
Although an individually stable set contains only acceptable partners, an individually
rational set may contain unacceptable partners. The central solution concept in the
(two-sided) matching literature is pairwise stability. A matching µ is pairwise-stable
if (i) for any i ∈ F ∪ W, Chi(µ(i)) = µ(i), i.e. µ(i) is individually stable, and (ii) for
any i,j ∈ F ∪W with i ∈ Mj, j ∈ Mi,a n dj/ ∈ µ(i),w eh a v ej ∈ Chi(µ(i)∪{j}) implies
i/ ∈ Chj(µ(j) ∪ {i}). For any matching µ, if there is an agent i with Chi(µ(i)) 6= µ(i),
then we say that individual i blocks µ,a n di ft h e r ei saﬁrm f ∈ F and worker
w ∈ W\µ(f) with w ∈ Chf(µ(f) ∪ {w}) and f ∈ Chw(µ(w) ∪ {f}),t h e nw es a yt h a t
pair (f,w) blocks µ.
We will introduce two group stability concepts in characteristic function form
games. A matching µ0 dominates am a t c h i n gµ via coalition T ⊆ F ∪ W if (i)
for all i ∈ T, j ∈ µ0(i) implies j ∈ T, and (ii) µ0(i) Âi µ(i) for all i ∈ T. Condition (i)
with Mm
i = Fm and Ms
i = Fs, and she also has a unit quota for each category, i.e. qm
i = qs
i =1 .
Using substitutability, the UK medical intern markets can be formulated as a many-to-two matching
problem without introducing two categories (see Roth 1991). However, to use this formulation, we
need to give up the equivalence between pairwise stability and credible group stability (see Section 3).
11In the UK markets, matching mechanisms utilize students’ preference orderings over individual
consultants in each category. Thus these mechanisms implicitly assume that the preference proﬁle of
interns is categorywise-responsive.
12Imagine that f ∈ F has preference ordering {w1,w 2}Â f {w1,w 3}Â f {w1}Â f {w2}Â f {w3}Â f
∅. This preference ordering is strongly substitutable, while it is not responsive with quota two. For
the other direction, see Example 3 below.
8requires that after deviation, members of T can be matched only with other members of
T (characteristic function form game). The core of the problem is the set of matchings
that are not dominated by any other matching. A matching µ0 weakly dominates a
matching µ via coalition T ⊆ F ∪ W if (i) for any i ∈ T, j ∈ µ0(i) implies j ∈ T, (ii)
we have µ0(i) ºi µ(i) for all i ∈ T, and (iii) µ0(i) Âi µ(i) holds for some i ∈ T.T h e
weak core of the problem is the set of matchings that are not weakly dominated by
any other matching.
As we will see below, the characteristic function approach has a limitation in the
many-to-many matching problem. Other solution concepts do not assume that devi-
ators need to discontinue all partnerships with outsiders. Let µ be a matching. A
matching µ0 is obtainable from µ via deviation by T if for any i ∈ F ∪ W and
any j ∈ Mi,( i )j ∈ µ0(i)\µ(i) implies {i,j} ⊆ T,a n d( i i )j ∈ µ(i)\µ0(i) implies
{i,j}∩T 6= ∅.Agroup deviation from µ is a group and a matching pair (T,µ0) such
that (i) µ0 is obtainable from µ via T, and (ii) for any i ∈ T we have µ0(i) Âi µ(i).W e
say a matching µ is group-stable if µ is immune to any group deviation from µ.13
We now discuss two notions of credibility of group deviations. The ﬁrst notion is
setwise stability introduced by Roth (1985b) and Sotomayor (1999). A group deviation
(T,µ0) from µ is individually stable if µ0 is an individually stable matching. A
matching µ is setwise-stable if µ is immune to any individually stable group deviation.
The second notion, which is newly introduced in this paper, is a stronger credibility
requirement than setwise stability. A group deviation (T,µ0) from µ is executable if
(i) for any i ∈ T, Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T)) = µ0(i),a n d
(ii) for any i,j ∈ T with j ∈ Mi\µ0(i), j ∈ Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T) ∪ {j}) implies
i/ ∈ Chj(µ0(j) ∪ (µ(j)\T) ∪ {i}).
This requires that µ0 is pairwise-stable within the members of T assuming that out-
siders are passive players. That is, individual stability requires only that no member of
T has an incentive to discontinue some of partnerships after a deviation, whereas exe-
cutability requires that after the deviation, the new matching is pairwise-stable within
T assuming that the outsiders are passive agents. A matching µ that is immune to
any executable group deviation is called a credibly group-stable matching. Credible
group stability is a weaker solution than setwise stability, since credibility requirements
on group deviations are more demanding in the case of executability.
13Group stability is originally deﬁned for many-to-one matching problems (see deﬁnition 5.4 in
Roth and Sotomayor 1990). We extend this deﬁnition to many-to-many matching problems. Group
stability is also the same concept as strong stability in network games as deﬁned in Jackson and van
den Nouweland (2001).
92.4 Core and Weak Core
It is well known that in one-to-one matching problems the core and the pairwise-stable
set coincide, i.e., the set of pairwise-stable matchings is equivalent to the core and
to the weak core. It is also true that in many-to-one matching problems, the set of
pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core coincide, although the core may be bigger.
This equivalence result no longer holds in many-to-many matching problems. The
following simple example (a simpliﬁed version of Example 2.6 in Blair 1988) illustrates
the diﬀerence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core in many-
to-many matching problems.
Example 1 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2} and W =
{w1,w 2}. Quota for the number of matches for each agent is two. Their preferences
are given as follows:
f1 f2 w1 w2
{w1}{ w2}{ f2}{ f1}
{w1,w 2}{ w2,w 1}{ f2,f 1}{ f1,f 2}
∅∅ ∅ ∅
{w2}{ w1}{ f1}{ f2}
In this game, the unique pairwise-stable matching is matching µ with µ(i)=∅ for
all i ∈ F ∪ W, and the unique weak core matching is a complete matching µ0 with
µ0(i)=Mi for all i ∈ F ∪ W. It is easy to see that empty matching µ is the unique
pairwise-stable matching, since for each pair (i,j) we have either ∅ Âi j or ∅ Âj i
and preferences are responsive with quota 2. It is also easy to see that the complete
matching µ0 i st h eo n l yw e a kc o r em a t c h i n g ,s i n c eµ0 is strictly individually rational,
and no group deviation can improve upon µ0. ¤
In many-to-many matching problems, the weak core does not make much sense.
This can be seen from the fact that in the above example the weak core matching µ0 is
not even pairwise-stable. This is because, in the deﬁnition of weak core or core, a group
deviation T (including a single agent deviation) has to act within T,a n dt h em e m b e r s
have to discontinue all the partnerships with members of (F ∪ W)\T. For example,
consider f1. Under µ0, f1 is matched with w1 and w2. She wants to discontinue a
partnership with w2, but wants to keep a partnership with w1.I nt h ed e ﬁnition of weak
core, if f1 alone wants to deviate, f1 needs to discontinue all partnerships. But why
should w1 need to discontinue her partnership with f1 in response to f1’s discontinuing
her partnership with w2? It is not clear, especially because w1 does not care what
happens to a match between f1 and w2: there is no such spillover or externality in
10this game. Actually, this is precisely why the weak core and the core are not the same
in many-to-one matching problems even under strict preference orderings. Without
including unaﬀected agents in a group deviation, a pair of agents cannot form a new
partnership. However, in the many-to-one matching problems, it is still possible to
argue that pairwise stability is a relevant game-theoretic concept, since we can keep
the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core. In
many-to-many matching problems, the problem with the weak core is more severe,
as we have seen. Our observation points out the limitation of describing a matching
problem as a characteristic function form game.
Before closing this subsection, we provide an example that has an empty core in a
many-to-many matching problem: the core may be empty in the characteristic function
form game even under responsive preferences.
Example 2 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5}
and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5}. Quotas are all two. The preference proﬁle is responsive
and given as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
{w2,w 3}{ w3,w 1}{ w1,w 2}{ w2}{ w1}
{w2,w 4}{ w3,w 5}{ w1}{ w2,w1}{ w1,w2}




{w2,w 5}{ w3,w 4}{ w2,w3}
{w3}{ w1} ∅









11w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
{f1,f 4}{ f2,f 5}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{f1}{ f2}{ f3,f1}{ f2,f1}{ f1,f2}











Choices in bold characters are the relevant choices that compose individually rational
matchings. Note that for each k ∈ {1,2,3}, ﬁrm fk d o e sn o tw a n tt ob em a t c h e d
with {wk},b u tf o re a c h  ∈ {1,2,3}\{k}, {w ,w k} is individually rational for fk.
However, for each k ∈ {1,2,3},w o r k e rwk wants to be matched with {fk},a n df o r
each   ∈ {1,2,3}\k, worker wk does not mind being matched with {fk,f  } (which is a
strictly worse match than {fk}), but she does not want to be matched with {f }.N o t e
also that ﬁrms f1 and f2 (workers w1 and w2) do not want to be matched with {w5} and
{w4} ({f5} and {f4}), respectively, but each of them does not mind being matched with
the partner set {w4,w 5} ({f4,f 5}), although this is a less favorable partner set. We will
show that the core of this problem is empty. Inspecting individually rational matchings
will be suﬃcient for determining the core, since a core matching is individually rational.
There are nine individually rational matchings (µ1,...,µ9)i nt h i se x a m p l e . 14 We list
them as follows:
µ1(f1)={w2,w 1},µ 1(f2)={w1,w 2},µ 1(f3)=µ1(f4)=µ1(f5)=∅;
µ2(f2)={w3,w 2},µ 2(f3)={w2,w 3},µ 2(f1)=µ2(f4)=µ2(f5)=∅;
µ3(f1)={w3,w 1},µ 3(f3)={w1,w 3},µ 3(f2)=µ3(f4)=µ3(f5)=∅;
µ4(f1)={w3,w 1},µ 4(f2)={w1,w 2},µ 4(f3)={w2,w 3},µ 4(f4)=µ4(f5)=∅;
µ5(f1)={w2,w 1},µ 5(f2)={w3,w 2},µ 5(f3)={w1,w 3},µ 5(f4)=µ5(f5)=∅;
µ6(f1)={w4,w 5},µ 6(f2)={w5,w 4},µ 6(f3)=µ6(f4)=µ6(f5)=∅;
µ7(f4)={w2,w 1},µ 7(f5)={w1,w 2},µ 7(f1)=µ7(f2)=µ7(f3)=∅;
µ8(f1)={w4,w 5},µ 8(f2)={w5,w 4},µ 8(f3)=∅,µ 8(f4)={w2,w 1},µ 8(f5)={w1,w 2};
µ9(f1)=µ9(f2)=µ9(f3)=µ9(f4)=µ9(f5)=∅;
None of the above matchings is in the core, although matching µ9 is the unique
14The proof is available upon request.
12pairwise-stable matching. For each individually rational matching, there is a match-
ing that dominates it via a coalition: µ1 →{f2,f3,w2,w3} µ2, µ2 →{f1,f3,w1,w3} µ3,
µ3 →{f1,f2,w1,w2} µ1, µ4 →{f1,f2,w4,w5} µ6, µ5 →{f4,f5,w1,w2} µ7, µ6 →{f1,f2,f3,w1,w2,w3} µ5,
µ7 →{f1,f2,f3,w1,w2,w3} µ4, µ8 →{f2,f3,w2,w3} µ2,a n dµ9 is dominated by any other indi-
vidually rational matching via the coalition of matched agents. Thus, the core (and the
w e a kc o r e )i se m p t y . ¤
2.5 Group Stability, Setwise Stability, and Credible Group
Stability
The main problem is that in a characteristic function form game, the ability of a
coalition is limited to the set of matchings within the coalition. Group deviations give
more power to deviators by allowing them to keep existing partnerships if they wish.
Although group stability is a natural concept, unfortunately, the set of group-stable
matchings may be empty in many-to-many matching problems. It is indeed empty in
Example 1, although it is a very simple setup. A pair (F ∪ W, µ0) is a group deviation
from the unique pairwise-stable matching µ, and since a group-stable matching must
be pairwise-stable, there is no group-stable matching in this problem. Thus, we need
to discuss credibility of group deviations (see Section 2.3 for deﬁnitions).
It is easy to see that the group deviation (F ∪ W, µ0) from µ is not individually
stable: agents are matched with unacceptable partners. This implies that, in Example
1, the unique pairwise-stable matching is setwise-stable, and we can get around the
nonexistence problem of a group-stable matching. However, it is not always the case
under responsive preferences. The following example (a simpliﬁed version of Example
3 in Sotomayor 1999) illustrates the diﬀerence between executability and individual
stability.
Example 3 Consider the following many-to-many matching problem. Quotas are all
two. Let F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4} with responsive preferences
13stated as
f1 f2 f3 f4 w1 w2 w3 w4
{w1,w 3}{ w2,w 3}{ w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ f2,f 3}{ f1,f 3}{ f1,f2}{ f1,f2}
{w1,w 4}{ w2,w 4}{ w1}{ w1}{ f2,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f1}{ f1}
{w1,w 2} {w2,w 1} {w2}{ w2} {f2,f 1} {f1,f 2} {f2}{ f2}
{w3,w4}{ w3,w4} ∅∅ {f3,f4}{ f3,f4} ∅∅
{w3,w 2}{ w3,w 1}
. . .
. . . {f3,f 1}{ f3,f 2}
. . .
. . .
{w4,w 2}{ w4,w 1}{ f4,f 1}{ f4,f 2}
{w1}{ w2}{ f2}{ f1}
{w3}{ w3}{ f3}{ f3}
{w4}{ w4}{ f4}{ f4}






The unique pairwise-stable matching µ is described by bold characters in the above table.
Now consider a group deviation (T,µ0) from µ with T = {f1,f 2,w 1,w 2} and µ0 fully
matched up within T only (in rectangles in the above table). This is beneﬁcial for each
agent in T, and it blocks µ. Moreover, since all partners of deviators are individually
stable and preferences are responsive, (T,µ0) is an individually stable deviation from
µ, in turn implying that there is no setwise-stable matching in this example.15 In
contrast, µ0 is not pairwise-stable with passive outsiders, since, say, agent f1 follows
the suggested deviation plan only partially. She is willing to establish partnerships with
w1, yet she would not be willing to establish her partnership with w2: instead, she keeps
her partnership with w3. Thus, it can be shown that the unique pairwise-stable matching
µ is also a credibly group-stable matching. ¤
In the next section, we investigate credibly group-stable matchings under various
preference restrictions.
15Note that preferences in this example (and the one in Sotomayor 1999) do not satisfy strong
substitutability; thus non-existence of a setwise-stable matching does not contradict Echenique and
Oviedo’s (2003) equivalence result. For example, let S = {w1,w 2} and T = {w3,w 4}.A l t h o u g h
S Âf1 T and w2 ∈ Chf1(S ∪ {w2})={w1,w 2},w eh a v ew2 / ∈ Chf1(T ∪ {w2})={w3,w 4}.
143 The Results
3.1 Substitutable Preferences
The ﬁrst result shows that credible group stability implies pairwise stability under
substitutable preferences.
Proposition 1 E v e r yc r e d i b l yg r o u p - s t a b l em a t c h i n gi sp a i r w i s e - s t a b l e ,w h e nº is sub-
stitutable.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive of the statement. Let º be substitutable and
µ be a pairwise-unstable matching. There are two possibilities: (i) there exists i ∈
F ∪ W with Chi (µ(i)) 6= µ(i), or (ii) there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F × W such that
w ∈ Chf(µ(f)∪{w}) and f ∈ Chw(µ(w)∪{f}). We inspect these two cases separately:
Case (i): A deviation ({i},µ 0) with µ0(i)=Chi (µ(i)) ⊂ µ(i) is executable, since agent
i has no incentive to recover any of the discontinued partnerships in µ. Hence, µ is not
credibly group-stable.
Case (ii): Since Case (i) does not hold, µ is an individually stable matching. Let µ0(f)=
Chf(µ(f) ∪ {w}), µ0(w)=Chw(µ(w) ∪ {f}), µ0(w0)=µ(w0)\{f} for any worker w0 ∈
W\Chf(µ(f) ∪ {w}),a n dµ0(f0)=µ(f0)\{w} for any ﬁrm f0 ∈ F\Chw(µ(w) ∪ {f}).
Then group deviation ({f,w},µ 0) from µ is executable, since agents f and w have
no incentive to recover any partnership that was discontinued in µ or remain single.
Hence, µ is not credibly group-stable, completing the proof. ¤
However, there may be a pairwise-stable matching that is not credibly group-stable
even when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has substitutable
preferences, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2 A pairwise-stable matching is not necessarily credibly group-stable,
when ºW (ºF)i ss u b s t i t u t a b l ee v e ni fºF (ºW)i sr e s p o n s i v e .
Proof. T h ef o l l o w i n ge x a m p l ep r o v e st h i sp r o p o s i t i o n . ¤
Example 4 Consider the following 16-agent many-to-many matching problem. Let
F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4, ¯ f1, ¯ f2, ¯ f3, ¯ f4} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4, ¯ w1, ¯ w2, ¯ w3, ¯ w4}.
Each ﬁrm has responsive preferences described as follows: each ﬁrm without a bar has
quota 3, and her preferences are lexicographic in the order of the ranking of individual
15partners, that is, for example, for f1, {w1} is more preferable than {¯ w2, ¯ w3, ¯ w4}.E a c h
ﬁrm with a bar has quota 1. Firm preferences over individual partners are as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 ¯ f1 ¯ f2 ¯ f3 ¯ f4
w1 w2 w3 w4 w1 w2 w3 w4
¯ w2 ¯ w3 ¯ w4 ¯ w1 w2 w1 w4 w3
¯ w3 ¯ w4 ¯ w1 ¯ w2 ∅∅∅∅





¯ w1 ¯ w2 ¯ w3 ¯ w4






Workers have substitutable preferences. Their preferences are stated as follows:
{f2, ¯ f2}Â w1 {f2,f 1, ¯ f1} Âw1 {f2,f 1}Â w1 {f2, ¯ f1}Â w1 {f2}Â w1
{¯ f2}Â w1 {f1, ¯ f1}Â w1 {f1}Â w1 { ¯ f1}Â w1 ∅ Âw1 ...,
{f1, ¯ f1}Â w2 {f1,f 2, ¯ f2} Âw2 {f1,f 2}Â w2 {f1, ¯ f2}Â w2 {f1}Â w2
{¯ f1}Â w2 {f2, ¯ f2}Â w2 {f2}Â w2 { ¯ f2}Â w2 ∅ Âw2 ...,
{f4, ¯ f4}Â w3 {f4,f 3, ¯ f3} Âw3 {f4,f 3}Â w3 {f4, ¯ f3}Â w3 {f4}Â w3
{¯ f4}Â w3 {f3, ¯ f3}Â w3 {f3}Â w3 { ¯ f3}Â w3 ∅ Âw3 ...,
{f3, ¯ f3}Â w4 {f3,f 4, ¯ f4} Âw4 {f3,f 4}Â w4 {f3, ¯ f4}Â w4 {f3}Â w4
{¯ f3}Â w4 {f4, ¯ f4}Â w4 {f4}Â w4 { ¯ f4}Â w4 ∅ Âw4 ...,
{f1} Â ¯ w1 {f2,f3,f4}Â ¯ w1 {f2,f 3}Â ¯ w1 {f2,f 4}Â ¯ w1 {f2}Â ¯ w1
{f3,f 4}Â ¯ w1 {f3}Â ¯ w1 {f4}Â ¯ w1 ∅ Â ¯ w1 ...,
{f2} Â ¯ w2 {f3,f4,f1}Â ¯ w2 {f3,f 4}Â ¯ w2 {f3,f 1}Â ¯ w2 {f3}Â ¯ w2
{f4,f 1}Â ¯ w2 {f4}Â ¯ w2 {f1}Â ¯ w2 ∅ Â ¯ w2 ...,
{f3} Â ¯ w3 {f4,f1,f2}Â ¯ w3 {f4,f 1}Â ¯ w3 {f4,f 2}Â ¯ w3 {f4}Â ¯ w3
{f1,f 2}Â ¯ w3 {f1}Â ¯ w3 {f2}Â ¯ w3 ∅ Â ¯ w3 ...,
16{f4} Â ¯ w4 {f1,f2,f3}Â ¯ w4 {f1,f 2}Â ¯ w4 {f1,f 3}Â ¯ w4 {f1}Â ¯ w4
{f2,f 3}Â ¯ w4 {f2}Â ¯ w4 {f3}Â ¯ w4 ∅ Â ¯ w4 ....
Given this preference proﬁle, a matching µ that matches each agent with the partners in
bold characters in the above tables is a pairwise-stable matching. However, a matching
µ0 that matches each agent with the partners in rectangles in the above tables is also a
pairwise-stable matching. Matching µ0 Pareto-dominates µ and µ0 is pairwise-stable in
F ∪ W together imply that group deviation (F ∪ W,µ0) from µ is executable. ¤
Note that in this example, the number of partners of an agent can diﬀer in diﬀerent
pairwise-stable matchings. This is one of the properties that does not hold under
substitutability though it does under responsiveness even in many-to-one matching
problems.16
3.2 Responsive and Categorywise-Responsive Preferences
In the last subsection, we observed that equivalence between pairwise stability and
credible group stability cannot be obtained when the preference proﬁle is substitutable.
Example 4 showed that this result is true even if one side has a responsive preference
proﬁle. However, in the UK markets, matching mechanisms utilize students’ prefer-
ence orderings over individual consultants in each category and consultants’ preference
orderings over individual students. Thus the usage of these mechanisms implicitly
assumes that students’ preference proﬁle is categorywise-responsive, and that consul-
tants’ preference proﬁle is responsive. Thus, it appears to be important to investigate
pairwise stability in this domain.17 Throughout this subsection, we assume that F has
responsive preferences and W has categorywise-responsive preferences.
We introduce one more piece of notation. For any agent i ∈ F ∪ W,a n da n y
S ⊆ Mi,l e tβi(S) ∈ S be such that j ºi βi(S) for all j ∈ S; i.e., βi selects the least
preferable element in the set of partners.
Using βi, it is easy to see that we can state the following lemma about pairwise-
stable matchings and executable deviations in this domain.
16Martinez, Masso, Neme, and Oviedo (2000) show that the set of single agents may not be the same
in pairwise stable matchings in a college admissions problem (many-to-one matching problem) under
substitutability, while Roth (1984a) shows it is the case under responsiveness (a.k.a. rural hospital
theorem). This phenomenon of substitutable preferences seems to play an important role in our
counterexample, too. See also Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2004) for an extensive discussion of many-to-one
matching problems by using an integrating approach.
17Echenique (2004) reports that substitutability allows exponentially more freedom in possible pref-
erence orderings than responsiveness and views this fact as a positive implication of the Gale-Shapley’s
algorithm based on preferences over individual partners.
17Lemma 1 When ºF is responsive with quotas (qf)f∈F,a n dºW is categorywise-
responsive with categories and quotas being (Kw,(Mk
w,q k
w)k∈Kw)w∈W, we have the fol-
lowing:
(1) A matching µ is pairwise-stable if and only if
(a) (respecting quotas)
(i) for any f ∈ F, |µ(f)| ≤ qf,a n d
(ii) for any w ∈ W and any k ∈ Kw, |µ(w) ∩ Mk
w| ≤ qk
w;
(b) (no blocking individual) for any i ∈ T, βi (µ(i)) Âi ∅;a n d
(c) (no blocking pair) for any pair (f,w) ∈ F ×W with f ∈ Mk
w\µ(w) for some
k ∈ Kw,
(A) ∅ Âf w,o rβf(µ(f)) Âf w with |µ(f)| = qf,o r
(B) ∅ Âw f,o rβw(µ(w) ∩ Mk
w) Âw f with |µ(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.
(2) For each matching µ, a group deviation (T,µ0) from µ is executable if and only
if
(a) (respecting quotas)
(i) for any f ∈ F ∩ T, |µ0(f)| ≤ qf,a n d
(ii) for any w ∈ W ∩ T and any k ∈ Kw, |µ0(w) ∩ Mk
w| ≤ qk
w;
(b) (no blocking individual among insiders possibly with passive outsiders)
(i) for any i ∈ T, βi (µ0 (i)) Âi ∅,
(ii) for any f ∈ F ∩ T,a n da n yw ∈ µ(f)\(T ∪ µ0 (f)), ∅ Âf w,o r
βf (µ0 (f)) Âf w with |µ0(f)| = qf,a n d





\(T ∪ µ0 (w)), ∅ Âw f,o rβw
¡













\µ0(w) for some k ∈ Kw,
(A) ∅ Âf w,o rβf(µ0(f)) Âf w with |µ0(f)| = qf,o r
(B) ∅ Âw f,o rβw(µ0(w) ∩ Mk
w) Âw f with |µ0(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.
S i n c et h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1i si m m e d i a t ef r o mt h ed e ﬁnitions of pairwise stability,
executability, responsiveness, and categorywise responsiveness, we skip it. The ﬁrst
main result of this paper is as follows:
18Theorem 1 The set of pairwise-stable matchings is equivalent to the set of credibly
group-stable matchings, when ºF is responsive, and ºWis categorywise-responsive.
One direction has been proved in Proposition 1 under substitutable preferences. To
show the equivalence, we need to prove the other direction.
Lemma 2 Every pairwise-stable matching is credibly group-stable, when ºF is respon-
sive, and ºWis categorywise-responsive.
Proof. Let ºF be responsive with quotas (qf)f∈F,a n dºW is categorywise-responsive
with categories and quotas given by (Kw,(Mk
w,qk
w)k∈Kw)w∈W.W e p r o v e t h i s l e m m a
by contradiction. Suppose that µ is a pairwise-stable matching and that (T,µ0) is an
executable group deviation from µ. This supposition will be made throughout the
proof.
First, we investigate the properties of newly created partnerships. Note that for





\µ(w) for some k ∈ Kw (a new partner),
we have f,w ∈ T,s i n c eµ0 is obtainable from µ.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e(T,µ0) is executable,
for these f and w,w eh a v ew Âf ∅ and f Âw ∅ by Condition 2-b-i of Lemma 1. We
ﬁrst prove the following claims.
























.S i n c e (T,µ0) is an executable deviation from µ, by Condition 2-b-
io fL e m m a1 ,w eh a v ew Âf ∅ and f Âw ∅. By Condition 1-c of Lemma 1 the
last two statements imply that µ is pairwise-unstable, that is because (f,w) blocks µ,
contradicting that µ is pairwise-stable. Therefore, such agents f and w do not exist.♦





\µ(w) ,e i t h e rβf (µ(f)) Âf w





Âw f with |µ(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.





\µ(w).S i n c e(T,µ0) is
an executable deviation from µ, by Condition 2-b-i of Lemma 1 we have w Âf ∅ and





Âw f. First consider
βf (µ(f)) Âf w. There are two cases: |µ(f)| = qf or |µ(f)| <q f:
Case 1. |µ(f)| = qf: Then the proof of Claim 2 is complete.
Case 2. |µ(f)| <q f:S i n c e µ is pairwise-stable, there are no blocking pairs. In







¯ ¯µ(w) ∩ Mk
w
¯ ¯ = qk
w by Condition 1-c of Lemma 1.





Âw f can be dealt with in a similar manner. ♦
Claim 2 allows us to introduce a new concept. For any worker w,a n yo fh e r





\µ(w),w es a yt h a tﬁrm f is pointed by






Âw f and |µ(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w. Claim 2 says that in any newly
created partnership, there is always an agent who is pointed by the other. Let PF be
the set of pointed ﬁrms, i.e.
PF = {f ∈ F : ∃w ∈ µ
0(f)\µ(f) such that βf (µ(f)) Âf w and |µ(f)| = qf}.
For any f ∈ PF, since there exists some w ∈ µ0 (f)\µ(f),p a i r(f,w) is a newly created
partnership, and f,w ∈ T must hold.
Claim 3:I faﬁrm f is pointed by r ≥ 1 workers, then |µ(f)\µ0(f)| >r .
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 .L e tﬁrm f be pointed by r workers w1,w 2,...,w r.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
βf(µ(f)) Âf wh for all h ∈ {1,...,r} and ﬁrm f’s quota qf is binding under µ.T h e
latter statement implies that ﬁrm f needs to discontinue partnerships with at least r
incumbent partners (each of whom is more preferable than w1,w 2,...,wr)i no r d e rt o
have new partnerships with w1,w 2,...,wr.S i n c e µ0(f) Âf µ(f) and ºf is responsive
with quota qf, there should be at least one more new partner w0 ∈ µ0(f)\µ(f) such that
w0 Âf βf(µ(f)) for ﬁrm f to be compensated. Hence, ﬁrm f establishes at least r +1
new partnerships. Since ﬁrm f’s quota is binding under µ, ﬁrm f must discontinue
strictly more than r old partnerships to create room for these new partners under µ0.♦
This claim simply says that if a ﬁrm is pointed by r workers, then she needs to
discontinue at least one additional partnership to improve her situation.
Claim 4:L e tf ∈ PF and w ∈ µ(f)\µ0(f) be such that f ∈ Mk
w for some k ∈ Kw (i.e.,
partnership (f,w) is discontinued). Then (i) w ∈ T,( i i )
¯ ¯µ0 (w) ∩ Mk
w








P r o o fo fC l a i m4 .L e tﬁrm f ∈ PF be pointed by worker w0 ∈ T and let worker
w ∈ µ(f)\µ0(f) be such that f ∈ Mk
w for some k ∈ Kw, that is, partnership (f,w) is
discontinued by the group deviation (T,µ0).S i n c ef is pointed by w0, βf (µ(f)) Âf w0.
Since w0 ∈ µ0 (f) and w ∈ µ(f)\µ0 (f),w eh a v ew Âf βf (µ0 (f)). We prove each part
separately:
(i) Suppose that w/ ∈ T.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t w ∈ µ(f)\(T ∪ µ0 (f)). This together
with w Âf βf (µ0 (f)) contradicts executability of (T,µ0) by Condition 2-b-ii of
Lemma 1. Therefore w ∈ T.
20(ii) Suppose that
¯ ¯µ0(w) ∩ Mk
w
¯ ¯ <q k
w.S i n c eµ is pairwise-stable, we have f Âw ∅ by
Condition 1-b-ii of Lemma 1. Since f,w ∈ T (see (i)), this together with w Âf
βf (µ0 (f)) contradicts the executability of (T,µ0) by Condition 2-c of Lemma 1.
Therefore
¯ ¯µ0(w) ∩ Mk
w
¯ ¯ = qk
w.





.S i n c e f,w ∈ T (see (i)), this together
with w Âf βf (µ0 (f)) contradicts the executability of (T,µ0) by Condition 2-c of






We deﬁne one more new concept. Let DW be the set of workers each of whom has
discontinued at least one partnership in some category with some ﬁrm in PF, i.e.







0(w) for some k ∈ Kw}.
By Claim 4 (i), it immediately follows that DW ⊂ T.
Claim 5:L e tw ∈ DW.I fw has discontinued r ≥ 1 partnerships with ﬁrms in PF in







¯ ¯ = r,
then there are at least r ﬁrms in PF who are pointed by worker w in category k.
Proof of Claim 5.L e tw ∈ DW be such that she has discontinued r ≥ 1 partnerships





\µ(w).W e w i l l





\µ0(w),t h a ti s ,ﬁrm f is one of the






Âw f.S i n c ef0 ∈ µ0 (w)∩Mk
w and f ∈ µ(w)∩Mk
w, it follows





. By Claim 2, we have either (i) βf0 (µ(f0)) Âf0 w with





Âw f0 with |µ(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w. Obviously, (ii)
does not hold in this case, and (i) follows. Thus, f0 is pointed by w, and f0 ∈ PF.











is pointed by w. By Claim 4 (ii), we have
¯ ¯µ0 (w) ∩ Mk
w
¯ ¯ = qk
w.S i n c ew has discontinued
r partnerships with ﬁrms in Mk
w ∩ PF, she must form at least r partnerships as well.
Thus, there must be at least r ﬁrms in Mk
w ∩ PF that are pointed by w. ♦
Claim 6: The set PF is non-empty.
P r o o fo fC l a i m6 .S i n c e (T,µ0) is a group deviation from µ,a n dµ is pairwise-stable
(and thus cannot be blocked by an individual), T ∩ W 6= ∅,a n df o ra n yw ∈ W ∩
T, µ0(w)\µ(w) 6= ∅.S u p p o s e t h a t PF = ∅.T h e n , f o r a n y w ∈ W ∩ T,a n da n y






Âw f. This implies µ(w) Âw µ0(w) by categorywise responsiveness of
ºw, contradicting (T,µ0) is a group deviation from µ.T h u s ,PF is non-empty. ♦
21We now are ready to complete the proof of the lemma. Set PF is non-empty by
Claim 6. Let r ≥ 1 be the number of partnerships that have been discontinued by
ﬁrms in PF. By Claim 4, these discontinued partnerships are with workers in DW.
By Claim 5, workers in DW who discontinued r partnerships with ﬁrms in PF would
establish at least r new partnerships with ﬁrms in PF by pointing them. By Claim 3,
those pointed ﬁrms in PF should have discontinued at least r +1partnerships. This is
a contradiction. Therefore (T,µ0) cannot be executable. ¤
It is important to have no category in the preferences of one side (here F). If both
sides have categorywise-responsive preference proﬁles, the equivalence between pairwise
stability and credible group stability does not hold (since a symmetric argument of
Claim 3 is not valid for set W, which has a categorywise-responsive preference proﬁle:
agent w’s loss in a category may be compensated by a gain in another category).
Indeed, the following example shows that our result is no longer true when both sides
have categorywise-responsive preferences.18
Example 5 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4} and
W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4}. There are two categories for each agent, and the partner set in
each category is given as odd-indexed partners for the ﬁrst category and even-indexed
partners for the second category. Each agent has a unit quota for each category. The
preferences are categorywise-responsive and stated as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 w1 w2 w3 w4
{w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ f1,f4}{ f3,f 2}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}
{w3,w 4} {w3,w 4} {w1,w 2} {w1,w 2} {f3,f 4} {f3,f 4} {f1,f 2} {f1,f 2}
{w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ w3,w4}{ w3,w4}{ f1,f2}{ f1,f2}{ f3,f4}{ f3,f4}
{w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f3,f 2}
{w3}{ w4}{ w1}{ w2}{ f4}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}{ f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{w2}{ w1}{ w4}{ w3}{ f1}{ f2}{ f3}{ f4}
{w4}{ w3}{ w2}{ w1}{ f3}{ f4}{ f1}{ f2}









Let µ be a matching described by bold characters, and let µ0 be a matching described by
rectangles. Both of them are pairwise-stable matchings. Moreover, µ0 (i) Âi µ(i) for
all i ∈ F ∪ W.T h e r e f o r e ,(F ∪ W,µ0) is an executable group deviation from µ. ¤
18This insightful example has been suggested by a referee.
22As l i g h t l ym o d i ﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h ea b o v ee x a m p l es h o w st h a tt h e r em a yn o te x i s ta
credibly group-stable matching when both sides have categorywise-responsive prefer-
ences. (An example that proves the following proposition is given in the appendix.)
Proposition 3 No credibly group-stable matching may exist, when both sides have
categorywise-responsive preferences.
4S t r a t e g i c - F o r m G a m e s
We can rewrite our matching problem as a strategic-form game in which each agent
is a player, each player simultaneously announces a subset of players she wants to be
matched with, and a match is made if and only if each of a pair of players announces
e a c ho t h e r ’ sn a m e .H e r e ,w es h o wt h a tt h i sg a m ei su s e f u lt oc l a r i f yt h er e l a t i o n s h i p s
among the notions of stable matchings in matching problems. A strategic-form
game is a list G(F ∪ W)=( F ∪ W, (Si,u i)i∈F∪W),w h e r ef o ra n yp l a y e ri ∈ F ∪ W,
her strategy set is Si =2 Mi, and her payoﬀ function is ui : Πj∈F∪WSj → R such that
ui(s) ≥ ui(s0) if and only if mi(s) ºi mi(s0),w h e r emi(s)={j ∈ Mi : j ∈ si and i ∈ sj}
is the list of the sets of players who are matched with i in each category under a
matching resulting from strategy proﬁle s ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj.L e t m =( mi)i∈F∪W be the
vector function such that for any s ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj, m(s) is the matching resulting from
s. For any I ⊆ F ∪ W,a n ys ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj and any s0
I ∈ Πj∈ISj, the pair (I,s0
I) is
a strategic coalitional deviation from s if ui (s0
I,s −I) >u i (s) for every i ∈ I. A
strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj is a strong Nash equilibrium of G(F ∪ W) if there
exists no strategic coalitional deviation from s∗ (Aumann 1959). In fact, it is easy
to see that the set of matchings generated by strong Nash equilibria of the strategic-
form game is equivalent to the set of group-stable matchings. Thus, if we apply the
notion of a strong Nash equilibrium to a many-to-one (and, of course, to a one-to-one)
matching game, the set of the matchings generated from strong Nash equilibria and
the set of pairwise-stable matchings are equivalent without invoking the weak core (by
the reason described earlier).19 However, in a many-to-many matching game, a strong
Nash equilibrium may not exist (recall Example 1 and consider the strategic-form game
deﬁned for this many-to-many matching problem).
Next we deﬁne a weaker solution concept based on credibility of strategic coalitional
deviations: coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1987).20
19One of the results in Kara and Sönmez (1997) shows that in a two-sided many-to-one matching
problem, the same game form implements pairwise-stable correspondence in strong Nash equilibrium.
20In a network formation problem, Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998) and Dutta and
Mutuswami (1998) use CPNE of a strategic-form game to analyze the resulting networks.
23For I ⊆ F ∪ W,c o n s i d e rareduced game G(I,s−I) that is a strategic-form game
with players in I and is created from G(I) by setting each player j ∈ (F ∪W)\I to be a
passive player who plays a given sj ∈ Sj no matter what happens. A coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is recursively deﬁned as follows:
(a) For any i ∈ F ∪W and any s−i ∈ Πj∈(F∪W)\{i}Sj,s t r a t e g ys∗
i ∈ Si is a CPNE of
reduced game G({i},s −i) if there is no s0
i ∈ Si with ui (s0
i,s −i) >u i (s∗
i,s −i).
(b) Pick any positive integer r<|F ∪ W|. Let all CPNEs of a reduced game
G(J,s−J) be deﬁned for any J ⊂ F∪W with |J| ≤ r and any s−J ∈ Πi∈(F∪W)\JSi.
Then,
(i) for any I ⊆ F ∪ W with |I| = r +1 , s∗
I is self-enforcing in reduced
game G(I,s−I) if for every J ⊂ I we have s∗
J is a CPNE of reduced game
G(J,(s−I,s ∗
I\J)) of G(I,s−I),a n d
(ii) for any I ⊆ F ∪ W with |I| = r +1 , s∗
I is a CPNE of reduced game
G(I,s−I) if s∗
I is self-enforcing in reduced game G(I,s−I),a n dt h e r ei sn o
other self-enforcing s0
I such that ui (s0
I,s −I) >u i (s∗
I,s −I) for every i ∈ I.
For any I ⊆ F ∪ W and any strategy proﬁle s, let CPNE(G(I,s−I)) denote the
set of CPNE strategy proﬁles on I for the game G(I,s−I). For any strategy proﬁle s,a
strategic coalitional deviation (I,s0
I) from s is credible if s0
I ∈ CPNE(G(I,s−I)).A
CPNE is as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that is immune to any credible strategic coalitional deviation.
The second main result of the paper is the following:
Theorem 2 The set of pairwise-stable matchings, the set of credibly group-stable
matchings, and the set of matchings generated from coalition proof Nash equilibria
of the strategic-form game G(F ∪ W) are all equivalent, when ºF is responsive, and
ºWis categorywise-responsive.
We know that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability if ºF is
responsive and ºW is categorywise-responsive (Theorem 1). Thus, we need to show
only that the resulting matching of a CPNE is pairwise-stable (proved below in Lemma
3), and that a credibly group-stable matching is the outcome of a CPNE (proved
below in Lemma 4). Although these statements will be proved under substitutability,
the equivalence between pairwise stability and credible group stability requires the
stronger preference restriction of Theorem 1.21 We start with Lemma 3. Recall that
21Under substitutability, Lemmata 3 and 4 show that the set of credible group-stable matchings ⊆
the set of matchings generated from CPNEs ⊆ the set of pairwise-stable matchings.
24for any strategy proﬁle s and any agent i ∈ F ∪ W, mi(s)={j ∈ si : i ∈ sj} and that
m =( mi)i∈F∪W.
Lemma 3 If s∗ ∈ CPNE(G(F ∪ W)) then m(s∗), the matching generated from s∗,
is a pairwise-stable matching, when º is substitutable.
Proof. Let s∗ ∈ CPNE(G(F ∪ W)). Suppose that matching m(s∗) is not pairwise-
stable. Then, either (i) there is i ∈ F ∪ W such that Chi(mi(s∗)) 6= mi(s∗) (matched
with an individually unstable agent), or (ii) there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F × W such
that w ∈ Chf(mf(s∗) ∪ {w}) and f ∈ Chw(mw(s∗) ∪ {f}) (pair (f,w) blocks m(s∗)).
Suppose that case (i) is true. This means that there is a player i who is willing to
discontinue some of the partnerships under m(s∗).S h ec a nd ot h a ti nG(F ∪ W) by
simply not announcing such partners. Considering G({i},s ∗
−{i}), we can easily see that
s∗
i is not a CPNE of the reduced game. This is a contradiction. Thus, suppose that
case (ii) is true, and there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F × W that blocks m(s∗).C o n s i d e r a
strategic coalitional deviation by {f,w} with (s0
f,s 0
w),w h e r es0
f and s0
w are such that
s0
f = Chf(mf(s∗) ∪ {w}) and s0
w = Chw(mw(s∗) ∪ {f}). This deviation is obviously
beneﬁcial for both agents f and w,s i n c emi(s0
f,s 0
w,s ∗
−{f,w})=Chi(mi(s∗) ∪ {j}) Âi
mi (s∗) for each i ∈ {f,w} and j ∈ {f,w}\{i} (pair (f,w) blocks m(s∗)). Since s∗ is
a Nash equilibrium (a CPNE is a Nash equilibrium as well), for any i ∈ F ∪ W and
any ˜ si ∈ Si,w eh a v emi(s∗) ºi mi(˜ si,s ∗




mi(s∗) that for any ˜ si ∈ Si,w eh a v emi(s0
f,s 0
w,s ∗
−{f,w}) Âi mi(˜ si,s ∗
−i).L e t {i,j} =
{f,w}. Since mi(˜ sf, ˜ sw,s ∗




−{f,w})=Chi(mi(s∗)∪{j}) ºi mi(˜ sf, ˜ sw,s ∗
−{f,w}). The last two statements








w)) is a credible strategic coalitional deviation from s∗, contradicting that
s∗ is a CPNE and completing the proof of the lemma. ¤
Lemma 4 For every credibly group-stable matching µ,t h e r ee x i s t ss ∈
CPNE(G(F ∪ W)) such that µ = m(s),w h e nº is substitutable.
Proof. Recall that a CPNE is immune to credible strategic coalitional deviations in the
game and a credibly group-stable matching is immune to executable group deviations in
the problem. Hence, if for any strategy proﬁle s and any credible strategic coalitional
deviation (T,s0
T) from s in game G(F ∪W), there exists an executable group deviation
from matching m(s) in the many-to-many matching problem, then the proof of the
lemma will be complete. We will prove this as follows:
25Let s be a strategy proﬁle and (T,s0
T) be a credible strategic coalitional deviation
from s. We denote the resulting strategy proﬁle by s0 =( s0
T,s −T).L e tµ be a matching
generated from s, i.e. µ = m(s),a n dl e tµ0 be the one generated from s0, i.e. µ0 =
m(s0). Note that s0
j = sj for any j ∈ (F ∪ W)\T. We will show that (T,µ0) is an
executable group deviation from µ.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, we will prove that (i) for any
i ∈ T, Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T)) = µ0(i), and (ii) for any i,j ∈ T with j ∈ Mi\µ0(i),
j ∈ Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T) ∪ {j}) implies i/ ∈ Chj(µ0(j) ∪ (µ(j)\T) ∪ {i}).
Condition (i): Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an agent i ∈ T with
Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T)) Âi µ0(i). Then proﬁle s0
T is not immune to agent i’s credible
strategic deviation s00
i = Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T)),s i n c eui(s00
i,s 0
F∪W\{i}) >u i (s0), contra-
dicting s0
T ∈ CPNE(G(T,s−T)).
Condition (ii): Suppose, to the contrary, that for some ﬁrm f ∈ T ∩F and worker w ∈
T ∩W with w 6∈ µ0(f),w e h a v e w ∈ Chf(µ0(f)∪(µ(f)\T)∪{w}) and f ∈ Chw(µ0(w)∪
(µ(w)\T) ∪ {f}). T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o ra n yi ∈ {f,w} and any j ∈ {f,w}\{i},w e
have Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T) ∪ {j}) Âi µ0(i).C o a l i t i o n {f,w} can deviate from s0 by
setting s00




−{f,w})=Chi(µ0(i) ∪ (µ(i)\T) ∪ {j}) Âi µ0(i)=mi (s0).S i n c e f and w




neither f nor w nor jointly {f,w} can credibly deviate from (s00
f,s 00
w,s 0
−{f,w}),i nt u r n











T ∈ CPNE(G(T,s−T)), completing the proof of the lemma. ¤
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper establishes a theoretical foundation of pairwise stability in many-to-many
matching problems when group deviations are allowed. We deﬁne credible group stabil-
ity by restricting group deviations based on their credibility and prove the equivalence
between pairwise stability and credible group stability when one side has responsive
preferences while the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. This domain
ﬁts well with the UK hospital-intern markets. Moreover, in the same domain, we show
the equivalence between pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated
by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of appropriately deﬁned noncooperative matching
games.
W ea l s oi n v e s t i g a t ew h a th a p p e n si ft h ep r e f e r e n c ed o m a i ni se x p a n d e d .W es h o w
by Examples 4 and 5 that if the domain is expanded then the equivalence no longer
holds, since some pairwise-stable matchings can be Pareto-ordered.
We conclude noting that our Theorems 1 and 2 hold under responsive preferences for
26general non-bipartite multi-partner matching problems.22 The proof is almost identical
to the ones of Theorems 1 and 2, so it is omitted. A general multi-partner matching
problem is a list (N,(Mi,ºi)i∈N) such that N is a ﬁnite set of agents, and for each
i ∈ N, Mi ⊆ N\{i} is the set of feasible partners for i,a n dºi is a preference ordering
over 2Mi.
Theorem 3 In general multi-partner matching problems, the set of pairwise-stable
matchings, the set of credibly group-stable matchings, and the set of matchings generated
from coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the strategic-form game G(N) are all equivalent,
when ºN is responsive.
Appendix
Example 6 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F =
{f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5,f 6,f 7,f 8} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5,w 6,w 7,w 8}. There are
two categories for each agent, and the partner set in each category is given as odd-
indexed partners for the ﬁrst category and even-indexed partners for the second category
(the latter four agents in each category have only one acceptable agent each). Each
agent has unit quota for each category. The preferences are categorywise-responsive
a n ds t a t e da sf o l l o w s :
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
{w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}
{w3,w 6}{ w5,w 4}{ w1,w 8}{ w7,w 2} ∅∅∅∅





{w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ w3,w4}{ w3,w4}
{w1,w 6}{ w5,w 2}{ w3,w 8}{ w7,w 4}
{w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}
{w3}{ w4}{ w1}{ w2}
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}
{w2}{ w1}{ w4}{ w3}
{w6}{ w5}{ w8}{ w7}






22Our results do not apply in Sönmez’s (1999) generalized matching problems (thus, neither in
Alkan’s (1988) k-sided matching problems with k ≥ 3, nor in housing market problems). Our theorem
requires that a partnership can be formed by a bilateral agreement only.
27w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8
{f1,f4}{ f3,f 2}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{f5,f4}{ f3,f 6}{ f7,f 2}{ f1,f 8} ∅∅∅∅





{f1,f2}{ f1,f2}{ f3,f4}{ f3,f4}
{f5,f 2}{ f1,f 6}{ f7,f 4}{ f3,f 8}
{f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f3,f 2}
{f4}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{f1}{ f2}{ f3}{ f4}
{f5}{ f6}{ f7}{ f8}






For example, for agent f1, in the even category, w2 is the best, w6 is the second best,
and w4 is the worst partners respectively. UnlikeE x a m p l e5 ,p a i r w i s e - s t a b l em a t c h i n g
is unique (the F-optimal and the W-optimal matchings are identical): a pairwise-stable
matching µ is described by bold characters (the latter four agents in each category is
unmatched). Now let µ0 be a matching described by rectangles. Note that µ0 is not
pairwise-stable, since w6 and f1 can deviate. However, µ0 is pairwise-stable within
T = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,w 1,w 2,w 3,w 4},a n dµ0 (i) Âi µ(i) for all i ∈ T. Therefore (T,µ0) is
an executable group deviation from µ, and there is no credibly group-stable matching.¤
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